Applied Christian Ethics addresses selected themes in Christian social ethics. Part one shows the roots of contributors in the realist school; part two focuses on different levels of the significance of economics for social justice; and part three deals with both existential experience and government policy in war and peace issues.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Intersection of Medicine and ReligionJohn C. DormoisThe practice of medicine offers a host of rewards to the practitioner. Besides the obvious intellectual satisfaction of solving a difficult diagnostic problem or the ability to make a comfortable living, I have found the greatest personal sense of moral gratification when helping [End Page 196] families negotiate the most challenging event in life: making decisions at end of life. Whether the (...) condition was a ruptured intracranial aneurysm with brain death or a patient with far advanced cancer struggling with the choice between experimental chemotherapy or choosing comfort therapy at home surrounded by family for the remaining days of life, the moral courage required to provide the best guidance was considerable. In my early years of practice I didn’t call my actions in these situations “courageous” nor were there moral “guidelines” providing a blueprint. I knew I responded with empathy and compassion and that this ability had a lot to do with being raised in a religious or spiritual home. At the same time, I suspected that some of the lack of empathy and compassion I witnessed in some of my colleagues was related to the very training programs of physicians. This essay traces the origin of my moral and ethical concerns about medical education and my intention to reinvigorate the spiritual or existential voice in medicine.An early life experience had a great deal to do with shaping my moral development. At age seven my family traveled through the West Indies. My father’s amateur radio hobby meant that at every stop we would be greeted by one of his radio contacts. One stop in particular was life changing.Port au Prince, Haiti was an unknown place to this seven year–old, but to say it was a culture shock to a boy from Kansas would be an understatement of epic proportions. It was during this visit that I experienced true poverty in its most blatant form. In downtown Port au Prince I saw limbless beggars and the deformed from polio and malnutrition. But it was the sight of the garbage dump near the center of town that changed my world forever. There, among piles of detritus, I saw children and families making their home in the dump. They had hollowed out a sort of cavern in the piles of trash that served as a place of refuge from both the rain and the sun.This experience in many ways has served as a framework and background for my life. Although seen through the eyes of a seven year–old, the picture can only be adequately understood within the context of being raised by religiously faithful parents, parents free of hypocrisy whose lives personified the best in Christian virtues and practices. These early experiences planted the seeds that would only fully blossom some 60 years later.Medical school was a demanding but exhilarating experience. Each day was a day of discovery … anatomy, physiology, pathology … all subjects opening up a whole new world to explore. Internal medicine suited me best since it was the specialty that most closely integrated all the basic sciences necessary to arrive at a diagnosis. I loved the elegance of endocrinology in particular where a given hormone mediator could cause widely different effects if present in excess or completely absent. But I was in the end drawn to cardiology since it combined complex physiology with my avocation, the love of running.There was, however, a disturbing aspect of medicine education that I observed affecting many of my classmates. Although I can vividly recall the enthusiasm that all of us shared as we donned our white coats for the first time and envisioned a future of caring for our patients, things gradually and insidiously changed over the next four years. The altruism and empathy that was so evident in the early years gradually lessened as graduation approached. I could not help being struck by this change and wondered at the time why that should happen. I had no insight then that what I had observed was a well recognized consequence of the medical school experience. I’m sure that the passage from professional training to practice in... (shrink)

The eight essays and three responses collected in Rethinking Borders were commissioned from an exciting range of leading younger writers, artists and intellectuals whose work has raised significant questions about the border cultures in ...

In 1865 Francis Galton published ‘Hereditary Talent and Character’, an elaborate attempt to prove the heritability of intelligence on the basis of pedigree data. It was the start of Galton's lifelong commitment to investigating the statistical patterns and physiological mechanisms of hereditary transmission. Most existing attempts to explain Galton's fascination for heredity have argued that he was driven by a commitment to conservative political ideologies to seek means of naturalizing human inequality. However, this paper shows that another factor of at (...) least equal importance has been overlooked by Galton scholars: his determination during the 1860s to be accepted among the ranks of the Darwinian inner circle. By hitching his career to the fortunes of what looked likely to emerge as a new scientific elite, Galton felt that he could bypass the typically slow and uncertain route to achieving scientific distinction. For this essentially strategic reason, between 1860 and 1865 he drifted away from a set of existing scientific concerns that were failing to deliver the approbation that he desired. Earnestly seeking to ingratiate himself with the Darwinian lobby, he then toyed with a variety of potential research projects relevant to Darwinian evolution. Yet Galton consistently failed to stimulate the enthusiasm of the Darwinians. Finally, however, after several months of ruminating, in 1864 he settled on a study of eminent pedigrees as a subject that was both germane and highly useful to the Darwinian enterprise. Galton's willingness to shift the direction of his scientific career during the 1860s underscores the importance of examining the micro‐politics of scientific careers in addition to their broader social and political context. This account also emphasizes the limitations of class‐based explanations even when considering scientists whose work seems so manifestly indicative of ideological motivation. (shrink)

An important book, one that can truly be called seminal. --America In a popular, informal style, the Jesuit author of many theological books and articles explores the question of interpersonal commitments . . . His book should do much to clarify a great deal of muddy thinking on a critical issue. --Library Journal Haughey is not addressing one life-style, but is writing for all, since all of us are committed to someone or something. His book is carefully written and deserves (...) careful reading. --Best Sellers John C. Haughey, SJ, is the author of 'The Holy Use of Money' and 'Should Anyone Say Forever?'. (shrink)

Each chapter heading bears a phrase from a contemporary author, held to incorporate the character of that section of the study under consideration. Chapter 1 carries the title given to early English translations of the Lettres provinciales; chapter 2 recalls the description of Pascall by Boyle and other English scientists; and chapter 3 draws from Kennett's preface to his version of the Pensees. The heading of chapter 4 is from Pope's Essay on Man. The exclamation which introduces chapter 5 concludes (...) an essay in the Gentleman's Magazine for 1789, probably by Boswell; the words for chapter 6 come from a pastoral letter of John Wesley; and chapter 7 represents the verdict of Coleridge. The title of the book itself is derived from the heading to the twenty-first chapter of Kennett's Pensees, which seems to have forecast the essence of the eighteenth-century's perplexity upon the issues raised by Pascal: 'The strange Contrarieties discoverable in Human Nature, with regard to Truth, and Happiness, and many other things.'. (shrink)

1. Anderson and Belnap's most explicit characterization of the fallacy of modality is as follows: "Modal fallacies arise when it is claimed that entailments follow from, or are entailed by, contingent propositions." The view which Nelson attributes to Anderson and Belnap, on the other hand, is "that necessary propositions are entailed only by necessary ones, never by contingent ones." Anderson and Belnap speak of "entailments," whereas Nelson generalizes to "necessary propostitions." The move is far from innocent, as we shall see. (...) For though Anderson and Belnap hold that every true entailment is a necessary proposition, not every necessary proposition is an entailment. In order to grasp the implications of this distinction more clearly, let us see how Anderson and Belnap's statement of the modal fallacy might legitimately be restated in terms of necessity. To that end we must draw a related distinction between necessary propositions and necessity propositions. A expresses a necessary proposition iff A → A → A holds. A expresses a necessity proposition iff A is of the form B → C. The particular form of these definitions is dependent on the fact that entailment rather than necessity is primitive in Anderson and Belnap's system; the forms in parentheses are the equivalents in terms of necessity. Now it follows from these definitions that every entailment is a necessity proposition and that every necessity proposition is an entailment. The modal fallacy may thus be equivalently characterized as the claim that a necessity proposition is entailed by a contingent proposition. That this is different from Nelson's formulation is clear from the following considerations. First, not every necessary proposition is a necessity proposition; example: "Either it is raining or it is not raining." Second, not every necessity proposition is a necessary proposition; example: any false necessity proposition. Thus the possibility is left open that some necessary proposition might be entailed by a contingent one. This is exactly the case with Nelson's example 2, "That every polychromatic surface is red entails that every polychromatic surface is colored." This might well be a theorem in a suitable extension of E. Such cases do not, however, arise among the theorems of EI. In that limited system, all that a contingent proposition can entail is itself. (shrink)

This book presents the first detailed history of the modern passport and why it became so important for controlling movement in the modern world. It explores the history of passport laws, the parliamentary debates about those laws, and the social responses to their implementation. The author argues that modern nation-states and the international state system have 'monopolized the 'legitimate means of movement',' rendering persons dependent on states' authority to move about - especially, though not exclusively, across international boundaries. This new (...) edition reviews other scholarship, much of which was stimulated by the first edition, addressing the place of identification documents in contemporary life. It also updates the story of passport regulations from the publication of the first edition, which appeared just before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, to the present day. (shrink)

The relation between body and mind is one of the oldest riddles that has puzzled mankind. That material and mental events may interact is accepted even by the law: our mental capacity to concentrate on the task can be seriously reduced by drugs. Physical and chemical processes may act upon the mind; and when we are writing a difficult letter, our mind acts upon our body and, through a chain of physical events, upon the mind of the recipient of the (...) letter. This is what the authors of this book call the 'interaction of mental and physical events'. We know very little about this interaction; and according to recent philosophical fashions this is explained by the alleged fact that we have brains but no thoughts. The authors of this book stress that they cannot solve the body mind problem; but they hope that they have been able to shed new light on it. Eccles especially with his theory that the brain is a detector and amplifier; a theory that has given rise to important new developments, including new and exciting experiments; and Popper with his highly controversial theory of 'World 3'. They show that certain fashionable solutions which have been offered fail to understand the seriousness of the problems of the emergence of life, or consciousness and of the creativity of our minds. In Part I, Popper discusses the philosophical issue between dualist or even pluralist interaction on the one side, and materialism and parallelism on the other. There is also a historical review of these issues. In Part II, Eccles examines the mind from the neurological standpoint: the structure of the brain and its functional performance under normal as well as abnormal circumstances. The result is a radical and intriguing hypothesis on the interaction between mental events and detailed neurological occurrences in the cerebral cortex. Part III, based on twelve recorded conversations, reflects the exciting exchange between the authors as they attempt to come to terms with their opinions. (shrink)

This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a (...) rational manner. (shrink)

In this article I address the ethical implications of the legal issues the U. S. Supreme Court resolved in New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny. In a ruling with far-reaching moral implications, the Court addressed truthtelling-journalism's primary ethical directive-and undermined it by favoring other moral principles and social goals. Much of this article focuses on the ethical arguments addressed to the Court in legal briefs that sought rulings that would support fundamental principals of ethical journalism. The creation of (...) actual malice as a legal concept in the Sullivan case owes more to the Court's pursuit of other moral and social values than strict legal reasoning, according to the descriptive theory of pragmatic instrumentalism, which informs this analysis. (shrink)

The planninnjg of this Study Week at the Pontifical Academy of Science from September 28 to October 4, 1964, began just two years before when the President, Professor Lemaitre, asked me if 1 would be responsible for a Study Week relating Psychology to what we may call the Neurosciences. 1 accepted this responsibility on the understanding that 1 could have as sistance from two colleagues in the Academy, Professors Heymans and Chagas. Besides participating in the Study Week they gave me (...) much needed assistance and advice in the arduous and, at times, perplexing task that 1 had undertaken, and 1 gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to them. Though there have been in recent years many symposia concerned with the so-called higher functions of the brain, for example witbh percep tion, learning and conditioning, and with the processing of information in the brain, there has to my knowledge been no symposium specifically with brain functions and consciousness since the memorable treating Laurentian Conference of 1953, which was later published in 1954 as the book, "Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. (shrink)

For Swedish visionary Emanuel Swedenborg, God's love and wisdom is the basis for everything that happens in the world, from creation itself to the details of our everyday existence. In this volume, he describes the nature of God and heaven and how they relate to our human existence. This edition is a reprint of an 1885 translation by John C. Ager.

The relation between body and mind is one of the oldest riddles that has puzzled mankind. That material and mental events may interact is accepted even by the law: our mental capacity to concentrate on the task can be seriously reduced by drugs. Physical and chemical processes may act upon the mind; and when we are writing a difficult letter, our mind acts upon our body and, through a chain of physical events, upon the mind of the recipient of the (...) letter. This is what the authors of this book call the 'interaction of mental and physical events'. We know very little about this interaction; and according to recent philosophical fashions this is explained by the alleged fact that we have brains but no thoughts. The authors of this book stress that they cannot solve the body mind problem; but they hope that they have been able to shed new light on it. Eccles especially with his theory that the brain is a detector and amplifier; a theory that has given rise to important new developments, including new and exciting experiments; and Popper with his highly controversial theory of 'World 3'. They show that certain fashionable solutions which have been offered fail to understand the seriousness of the problems of the emergence of life, or consciousness and of the creativity of our minds. In Part I, Popper discusses the philosophical issue between dualist or even pluralist interaction on the one side, and materialism and parallelism on the other. There is also a historical review of these issues. In Part II, Eccles examines the mind from the neurological standpoint: the structure of the brain and its functional performance under normal as well as abnormal circumstances. The result is a radical and intriguing hypothesis on the interaction between mental events and detailed neurological occurrences in the cerebral cortex. Part III, based on twelve recorded conversations, reflects the exciting exchange between the authors as they attempt to come to terms with their opinions. (shrink)

This book explains the classical Christian doctrine of God's timelessness and defends it against contemporary philosophical criticism. The historical background and discussion of this concept is reviewed from Parmenides to the present, and particular note is made that the doctrine cannot be detached from the various metaphysical systems in which it is embedded.